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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reasoning and effect of the March 1999 House 
of Lords Pinochet judgment. It argues that the decision that immunity is unavailable for 
former Heads of State who commit torture could be applied to other crimes against 
humanity and to sitting Heads of State. It suggests that the ruling that Pinochet could not 
be extradited for torture before 1988 failed to take into account the emerging 
international legal duty to prosecute or extradite perpetrators .of crimes against humanity. 
It proposes three alternative ways that that duty could have been meet, consistent with 
British law. The paper then reviews New Zealand laws on the prosecution and 
extradition of international crimes. It concludes that the legal situation in respect of 
torture is similar to the United Kingdom, but that there are considerable legislative 
hurdles to prosecuting other crimes against humanity which should be removed. The 
paper concludes that the judgment is already having a positive deterrent effect on 
international criminals, and that it may result in further prosecutions of former Heads of 
State and state agents who harm their citizens. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and annexures) 
comprises approximately 11 OOO words. 
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"Jn future those who commit atrocities against civilian populations must 
expect to be called to account if fundamental human rights are properly to 
be protected. In this context, the exalted rank of the accused can afford no 
defence. " Lord Millet. 
INTRODUCTION 
Late last year, an elderly foreign visitor was arrested in a hospital in 
London. The visitor was Chile's former Head of State, Senator Augusto 
Pinochet. Spain had asked for his extradition from Britain for crimes 
against humanity. The arrest marked the beginning of one of the century's 
most important and complex judicial processes. 
This paper analyses the landmark second judgment of the House of Lords. 1 
The decision was that Pinochet was not immune from the charges of 
torture, but could only be extradited for torture committed after 1988, when 
Britain introduced a statutory crime of extraterritorial torture. 
The case represents graphically the collision between fundamentally 
incompatible concepts, the universal liability of individuals for 
fundamental human rights abuses and the sanctity of state and Head of 
State sovereignty. The decision will help to confirm the supremacy of 
5 
human rights for the new millenium, but it also demonstrates the need to 
ensure that the protection of international legal human rights norms is not 
impeded by statutory technicalities. 
The two hundred and one page judgment of the House of Lords is of such 
complexity that even its authors concede that it is obscure.2 This paper 
will endeavour to make sense of that obscurity, and analyse the likely 
effect of the judgment on the domestic prosecution of crimes against 
humanity. 
Part I of the paper sets out the factual background to the case. It outlines 
the nature of the abuses that occurred under Pinochet's regime, and the 
failure of Chile to take serious steps to punish those injustices. This 
analysis provides context and basis for international intervention. Part II 
also briefly traverses the British and Spanish cases leading up to the 
decision. 
Part II summarises the second House of Lords decision and examines its 
two main components: sovereign immunity and extradition. On the 
question of sovereign immunity, the paper argues that the Law Lords 
applied orthodox legal concepts, but reached a groundbreaking conclusion, 
1 R v Bow Street Stipendiary Magistrate and ors exp Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) ( 1999] 2 
WLR827. 
2 Joshua Rosenberg "The Pinochet Case and Cameras in Court" [ 1999] PL 178, 183 . 
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that could facilitate the prosecution of former Heads of State for any crime 
against humanity. It suggests that the same reasoning could be used to 
prosecute sitting Heads of State. On the extradition question, the paper 
suggests that there is a duty to punish crimes against humanity, and that the 
strict interpretation of the Extradition Act 1989 (UK) was not appropriate. 
It proposes three alternative approaches under which Pinochet could have 
been extradited to face charges on all counts of torture. 
Part III asks what would happen if Pinochet arrived in New Zealand 
tomorrow and Spain sought his extradition for crimes against humanity. It 
reviews the New Zealand common law and statutory framework on 
sovereign immunity, crimes again humanity, and extradition, and 
concludes that legislative amendments are required if New Zealand is to 
meet the evolving obligation to prosecute or extradite international 
criminals. 
I BACKGROUND 
A Pinochet's Coup 
General Pinochet led a bloody military takeover of the democratically 
elected socialist government of Salvador Allende on 11 September 1973. 
7 
The takeover was violent and quick. 3 Power in the new regime was 
concentrated in Pinochet. Initially, he had the dual roles Commander in 
Chief of the Army and Supreme Commander of the Nation. He later 
became President. Upon seizing of power, he set up a high level military 
group, which became the National Intelligence Directorate (DINA). Their 
task was to eliminate the far left. That group operated under Pinochet's 
direct command, and was responsible for widespread human rights abuses. 4 
B Crimes Committed 
The tactics alleged to have been used by the DINA are shocking, even in 
the context of the array of other human rights violations seen this century. 
The Spanish request graphically describes the nature of the torture alleged 
to have been committed: 
The most usual method was "the grill" consisting of a 
metal table on which the victim was laid naked and his 
extremities tied and electrical shocks were applied to 
the lips, genitals, wounds or metal prosthesis; also two 
persons, relatives or friends, were placed in two metal 
3 Robert Harris A Tale of Two Chileans ( Pinochet Supporters Abroad, London, 1998), 
28-29. 
4 Robert J Quinn "Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the 
Human Rights Violations of A Prior Regime: Chile's New Model" (1994) Fordham L 
Rev 905, 912. 
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drawers one on top of the other so that when the one 
above was tortured the psychological impact was felt by 
the other; on other occasions the victim was suspended 
from a bar by the wrists and/or the knees, and over a 
prolongued period while held in this situation electric 
current was applied to him, cutting wounds were 
inflicted or he was beaten; or the "dry submarine" 
method was applied, i.e. placing a bag on the head until 
close to suffocation, also drugs were used and boiling 
water was thrown on various detainees to punish them 
as a foretaste for the death which they would later 
suffer. 5 
The present Chilean Government has acknowledged that serious abuses 
were committed under Pinochet's regime to the United Nations Committee 
on Torture. 6 In 1990, it told the Committee "[the] policy was characterised 
by very serious forms of human rights violations: executions without trial; 
executions following trials in which due process was not guaranteed; mass 
arrests of persons who were taken to concentration camps where they were 
subjected to very degrading conditions of detention and many of whom 
"disappeared"; widespread torture and ill treatment ... This is the context 
5 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate exp Pinochet Urgarte (No. I) 
[ 1998] 3 WLR, 1456. 
6 Chile became a party to the Torture Convention in 1988. 
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in which the use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment was situated during the previous regime".7 
A National Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up by the new 
Government in April 1990. Its mandate was investigate murder and 
disappearances only. The Commission, together with its successor, the 
Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation, found that there had been 1, 102 
"disappearances", and 2,095 extrajudical executions and deaths under torture 
during Pinochet's regime. 8 Both reports said that the DINA played a central 
role in implementing the policies, and that the DINA reported directly to 
General Pinochet.9 Neither commission published the names of the 
perpetrators of crimes, 10 and no prosecutions resulted. 11 
C Domestic impunity 
(1) Amnesty 
In April 1978 the military junta issued Decree Law No 2191. This granted 
"amnesty to all persons who committed, as perpetrators, accomplices, or as 
7 Amnesty International "Chile: Torture: An International Crime" Al Index AMR 22 
October 1999. 
8 Amnesty International "United Kingdom: The Pinochet Case. Universal Jurisdiction 
and the Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity" AI Index EUR 45/0 I /99, 
January I 999, 4. 
9 "United Kingdom : The Pinochet Case", above n 8, 4. 
'
0 Daan Bronkhorst Truth and Reconciliation: Obstacles and Opportunities for Human 
Rights (Amnesty International Dutch Section, Amsterdam, 1995) 20. 
10 
covering up, criminal offences during the period of the State of Siege, 
between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1978, unless they are currently 
on trial or have been convicted". Common crimes were exempted from the 
amnesty. The exclusion of those already convicted ensured that political 
prisoners remained in prison. 12 
This amnesty has been a key feature in ensuring impunity for those 
involved in the offences, as the majority of the abuses occurred in the first 
four years of the regime. 13 In the first year of the democratic Government 
the amnesty was declared legal by the Supreme Court14 so it is now 
effectively constitutionally entrenched. 
(2) Personal immunities 
Pinochet benefits from full personal immunity under the Chilean 
constitution in light of his position as Senator for life, which he has held 
since his retirement from the armed forces . Under the Chilean constitution, 
which he was instrumental in drafting, Senators for life cannot be tried 
under any charges. Although this immunity can be lifted in certain 
11 Quinn, above n 4,918. 
12 Quinn, above n 4, 918 . 
13 "United Kingdom: The Pinochet Case", above n 8, 5. 
14 "United Kingdom: The Pinochet case", above n 8, 4. 
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circumstances, 15 prior to stepping down Pinochet secured the positions of 
sympathetic Supreme Court judges, creating a further hw:dle to his 
• 16 prosecution. 
D Spanish Indictment 
In light of the legislative bars against the prosecution of Pinochet in Chile, 
victims of his regime ( some of whom are now citizens of other states), and 
human rights activists have been anxious to have him indicted under an 
alternative jurisdiction. 
Prosecution by an international body has not to date been an option. No 
international criminal tribunal has been set up to look into crimes 
. d . Chil 17 comm1tte m e. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court 1998, although designed to create universal jurisdiction for crimes of 
the nature of those committed during the Pinochet regime, is not 
• 18 retrospective. 
15 Under art 58 of the Chilean Constitution and arts 611 to 618 of the Penal Procedure 
Code parliamentary immunity can be lifted. However this is unlikely to occur under the 
present regime. See "United Kingdom : The Pinochet case" above n. 8, 5. 
16 Douglas Cassel "The Pinochet Case: Expanding International Accountability" to be 
published in Northwestern Journal of International Affairs, 4. 
17 The only international criminal tribunals set up to date have been the Nuremberg 
Tribunal , International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, and the Tokyo Tribunal. 
18 Article 24 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1988. 
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The Spanish Courts began investigating Pinochet's alleged involvement of 
the murder of seven people in 1996, and the case expanded into charges of 
genocide, murder and torture. However, with Pinochet in Chile, Spain was 
unable to proceed substantively with the case. 19 
Pinochet's private visit late last year to the United Kingdom created the 
opportunity to fill the missing component in the Spanish proceedings. 
Pinochet was hospitalised for back problems and human rights activists 
learned of his presence. On 16 October 1998, Spain sought his provisional 
arrest for the murder of Spanish citizens pending a formal extradition 
request. 20 The British Crown Prosecution Service agreed. Later that day, 
Pinochet's hospital bed was surrounded by police and he was arrested. 
So commenced the first step in a complex and controversial legal web. 
19 Equipo Nizkor Special Report on the Preparation and development of General Augusto 
Pinochet 's detention and Spanish Judges 's Ruling Recognising the Principle of Universal 
Criminal Jurisdiction f or Domestic Courts, (Madrid, 5 November 1998) 2 
<http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/chile/ juicio/report.html.> 
The proceedings had been launched in Spain prior to Pinochet' s arrival in Britain, but a 
trial in absentia was not possible. See Peter Weiss "Punishing Pinochet" 8 August 1998, 
CAQ no 64 <http://www.izguirda-
unida.es/Derechos/Documentos/ Art%20peter%20weis%201998.htm> , 2; Human Rights 
Watch "Chile: When Tyrants Tremble: The Pinochet Case", 2< 
http://www.hrw.org/hrw/reports/ 1999/chile/>. 
20 Initially the warrant was for murder. On 23 October, a second provisional warrant was 
executed following a second Spanish international warrant of arrest. It broadened the 
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E Initial Court Cases 
The legal process for extraditing a person from the United Kingdom is not 
simple, even in the most pedestrian of cases. However Pinochet has to date 
pursued all legal avenues available to fight the charges.2 1 
His first request was for habeus corpus. He also challenged the legality of 
the issue and execution of the provisional warrants for his arrest. Although 
his plea for habeus corpus was declined, on 28 October the High Court 
granted certiorari to quash the second provisional warrant, on the grounds 
that as a former Head of State, Pinochet enjoyed immunity from criminal 
prosecution.22 However, the Court held that its order would not take effect 
until the determination of any appeal, and granted immediate leave for the 
Crown Prosecution Service, on behalf of the Government of Spain, to 
appeal its decision to the House of Lords. Accordingly, Pinochet remained 
under arrest. 
terms of the warrant from murder to torture, conspiracy to commit torture, hostage taking, 
conspiracy to commit hostage taking, and conspiracy to commit murder. 
21 Most recently, on 22 October 1999 Pinochet' s lawyers filed an appeal against the 
Metropolitan Magistrate's 8 October 1999 ruling that extradition could proceed. T R 
Reid "Pinochet Appeals Extradition from Britain" Washington Post, 23 October 99, 
AJ8 . 
14 
The legal machinations continued abroad. In November Spain's highest 
criminal Court, the Spanish National Court, unanimously upheld the 
legality of Judge Garzon's proceedings, in the face of a challenge by the 
Government of Spain. The Court held that Spain was able to prosecute 
Pinochet on the basis that there is universal jurisdiction for genocide, state 
terrorism, and torture, and additionally because more than 50 Spanish 
nationals were among the victims. The result of this decision was a formal 
extradition request from Spain to the United Kingdom.23 
In Britain, the House of Lords met in the same month to consider the 
appeal against the High Court order quashing the second provisional 
warrant. With the assistance of arguments from Amnesty International, 
which a committee of Lords had granted leave to intervene in the appeal, 
the majority judges held that Pinochet's former position as Head of State in 
Chile did not render him immune from prosecution, and that the extradition 
d. ld . M procee mgs cou contmue. 
The decision, broadcast live,25 was hailed as a victory for human rights. 
But the euphoria was short lived. A few days after the decision, Pinochet's 
lawyers learned for the first time that one of the majority judges, Lord 
22 For a discussion of the judgment see Paul Simo "The Act of State Doctrine and "Public Acts" for the purpose of Sovereign Immunity: a commentary on the Pinochet decision of 
the High Court of England" http://www.nd.edu/-psimo/pinochetnew.html. 23 Cassel, above n 16, 7-8. 
24 Pinochet No I , above n 5 . 
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Hoffman, was a Chair and director of Amnesty International Charity 
Limited, and his wife; a long serving employee of Amnesty International. 
Pinochet' s lawyers petitioned the House of Lords for annulment of the 
decision on the ground that Lord Hoffman should have been disqualified 
from sitting on the grounds of possible bias, and in an almost 
unprecedented decision, an appeal committee of five Lords agreed. 
26 
II THE SECOND HOUSE OF LORDS DECISION 
The second House of Lords case was heard before a panel of seven Law 
Lords, none of whom was involved in the first case. The decision to 
appoint seven judges to hear the case underlined the gravity of the case. 
In the first House of Lords case the legal arguments had related almost 
exclusively to the question of whether or not Pinochet was immune from 
prosecution in light of his former position as Head of State. In this second 
case, however, the House of Lords were faced with a new angle: whether 
the crimes were in fact extradition crimes within the meaning of the 
Extradition Act 1989. This issue had not been contested by the defence in 
the earlier hearings. 
25 Rosenberg, above n 2, 183. 
26 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate exp Pinochet Urgarte (No. 2) 
[ 1999] 4 All ER, 897. 
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In short, the decision of the House of Lords was that: 
1. Pinochet' s status as the former Head of State of Chile afforded him 
immunity in respect of his "official functions" performed while in 
office. 
2. The commission of torture is not an "official function" of a Head of 
State. 
3. Pinochet could be extradited only in respect of torture committed after 
1988, as the United Kingdom did not have extraterritorial jurisdiction 
for crimes of torture prior to 1988. 
The decision that Pinochet could only be extradited for torture committed 
after 1988 drastically reduced the number for charges for which he could 
be extradited.27 
A Torture Convention and the Relevant Legal Concepts 
27 Spain has since submitted 34 more post 1988 charges. On 8 October 1999 the Bow St 
Magistrates Court ruled that it was entitled to receive and consider that further 
information, and committed Pinochet to await the decision of the Secretary of State on 
Extradition. "Pinowatch Extradition ruling", marga@derechos.org, 9 October 1999, 4. 
17 
In order to understand the judgment it is useful to first set it in context by 
outlining the relevant provisions of the Torture Convention and the 
international legal concepts underpinning it. 
(]) Torture Convention 
The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 1984 ("The Torture Convention") sets up 
universal jurisdiction for crimes of torture in the domestic jurisdictions of 
the States Parties. Under Article 4 of the Torture Convention, Stat.es 
Parties are obliged to ensure that all acts of torture are offences under their 
domestic criminal law. Under Article 5, parties are required to set up 
jurisdiction over offences when the offender is present in its territory, so 
that they can be either prosecuted or extradited.28 A fundamental purpose 
of the Convention is to ensure that there is no safe haven for torturers.29 
28 See Matthew Lippman 'The Development and Drafting of the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment" (1994) 17 2 BC Int'l & Comp L Rev 275,316. 
29 J Herman Burgers and Hans Danelius The United Nations Convention Against Torture: 
A Handbook on the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988) 72. 
18 
All parties to the Pinochet proceedings, namely Britain, Spain and Chile, 
ratified the Torture Convention in 1988. 
(2) Jus cogens 
A "jus cogens" rule is "a peremptory norm of general international law ... 
accepted and recognised by the international community of states as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be 
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having 
the same character". 30 Jus cogens laws have the highest status of all 
international laws and override other laws. 31 
(3) Crimes against humanity 
Crimes against humanity are crimes of such seriousness that they strike at 
the conscience of mankind. Their gravity is such that their commission is 
seen as an attack against the international order. Accordingly, they may be 
prosecuted under international law.32 The most up to date definition of 
30 Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 
31 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International Law I (9 ed, 
Longman Group UK Ltd, 1992)4, Karen Parker and Lyn Beth Neylon "Jus cogens: 
Compelling the Law of Human Rights" (1999) 12 Hast lnt'l & Comp L Rev 411, 414-
416; Andreas Zimmerman "Sovereign Immunity and Violations of International Jus 
cogens - Some Critical Remarks" (1995) 16 Mich L Rev 433, 437-438; M Cherif 
Bassiouni "International Crimes: Jus cogens and Obligatio erga omnes" 59:4 Law & 
Contemp Probs 63, 67. 
32 Christopher C Joyner "Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in 
Bringing War Criminals to Accountability" ( 1996) 59: 4 Law & Con temp Probs, 153, 
19 
crimes against humanity is contained in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court 1998. The crimes included are the 
following, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack
33 
against a civilian population: murder, extermination, enslavement,34 
deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilisation or other grave sexual violence, persecution of a group m 
connection with another crime against humanity, disappearance, apartheid, 
or other inhumane acts causing great suffering or injury. 
Genocide has similar legal characteristics to a crimes against humanity but 
is sometimes categorised separately.35 
The laws proscribing crimes against humanity and genocide are generally 
'd d b . 36 cons1 ere to e;us cogens. 
167. Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (5ed, Oxford, New York, 
1998) 566-567. Article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 
Nuremberg conferred jurisdiction upon the Tribunal for "crimes against humanity, 
namely murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on 
political, racial, or religious grounds ... whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated." 
33 Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court makes it clear that 
an "attack" is not necessary a military attack. 
34 Slavery is one of the oldest international crimes. For a discussion of the rules on the 
prosecution, extradition and punishment of slavery in the various Conventions outlawing 
slavery see M Cherif Bassiouni and Edward M Wise Aul Dedere Aut Judicare: The Duty 
to Extradite or Prosecute in International Law (Martin us N ijhoff Publishers, The 
Netherlands, I 995) 132-156. 
35 Genocide is criminalised under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide 1948 "the Genocide Convention" . 
36 Jus cogens and Obligatio erga omnes", above n3 I, 68. 
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(4) Immunity ratione personae 
Sitting Heads of State and diplomatic heads of mission have traditionally 
benefited from immunity ratione personae. This is a blanket immunity, 
attaching to the person of the office holder. It renders the incumbent 
immune from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of other states. It is based 
on the notion that one sovereign monarch should not be subject to the 
jursidiction of another sovereign monarch, as they are of equal status.37 
The immunity has existed for centuries, and historically existed to avoid 
offending the sovereign's dignity and mystique. 38 
(5) Immunity ratione materiae 
A former Head of State (and former head of a diplomatic mission) has 
traditionally benefited from immunity ratione materiae, a lesser immunity 
than that enjoyed during his or her tenure. The immunity is in respect of 
official functions performed while in office only. The immunity is the 
same as that of the State itself. 39 
37 Arthur Watts "The Legal Position in International Law of Heads of State, Heads of 
Government and Foreign Ministers" (1994) 11 Recueil Des Cours, 19, 52. 
38 
Malcolm M Shaw International Law (4 ed, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1997) 492. For a useful description of the early development of Head of State immunity 
21 
B Sovereign Immunity 
The first key question that the Law Lords considered was whether Pinochet 
could benefit from immunity ratione materiae, in light of his position as 
the former Head of State in Chile. The Law Lords had the advantage of 
the earlier House of Lords judgment, which had carefully considered that 
point, and they did not depart substantially from their predecessors ' 
conclusion. 
The Law Lords started their consideration of the issues by looking at the 
relevant domestic statutes. Unlike the extradition question, however, 
which they decided turned on the domestic statutes, they considered that 
the statutes relevant to the immunity question reflected customary 
international law. They came to this view because under s20(1)(a) of the 
State Immunity Act 1978, the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 applies, 
subject to "any necessary modifications", to a Head of State as ifs/he were 
the Head of a diplomatic mission. The Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 
imports into United Kingdom law the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations 1961 , which provides that a diplomatic agent has immunity from 
criminal and civil jurisdiction until s/he leaves the post, but that the 
see William R Hartl "Sovereign Immunity: An outdated doctrine faces demise in a 
changing judicial arena." (1993) 64 Nth Dak L Rev 401 , 402-4. 
39 Watts, above n 37, 88-89. 
22 
immunity subsists for acts performed "in the exercise of his functions". 40 
At international law, too, a former Head of State has immunity in respect 
of official functions performed during his or her tenure . 
The Law Lords held, in a compellingly simple conclusion, that the 
commission of torture could not be an "official function" of a Head of 
State, and that immunity ratione materiae was therefore unavailable to 
Pinochet. This is the first time that a domestic court has held that a former 
Head of State of a foreign country is not immune from its criminal 
jurisdiction. However all the majority Law Lords expressed obiter views 
that sitting Heads of State are inviolable. 41 
(1) Does the absence of immunity ratione materiae for torture extend 
to other crimes against humanity? 
The question of whether immunity ratione materiae was unavailable 
because torture is a crime against humanity, or because torture is outlawed 
internationally by the Torture Convention, to which all parties were 
signatory, is pivotal when assessing the implications of the judgment. If it 
40 
A less circuitous route to the same conclusion was in fact available to the Law Lords. 
Section 20(l)(a) of the State Immunity Act applies the Diplomatic Privileges Act 1964 to 
"a sovereign or other Head of State". The absence of a temporal element in the section 
would suggest that it refers only to sitting sovereigns and Heads of State. Thus, in the 
absence of a statutory provision codifying the immunity oho former Heads of State, the 
Law Lords could have immediately applied customary international law, on the basis that 
it forms part of British common law. 
23 
was the latter, the judgment will be narrow in its effect on international 
law. If, however, it was the former, then the case will have bro;:id reaching 
ramifications, as it will provide authority for the prosecution of former 
Heads of State in domestic courts for any crimes against humanity. 
42 
A variety of reasons were advanced by the Law Lords when concluding 
that Pinochet was not immune for the charges of torture. The reasoning of 
the different judges on this important issue is somewhat complex, so it is 
analysed below in some detail. 
It is not clear from Lord Browne Wilkinson' s judgment exactly why he 
considered immunity was unavailable for torture. Initially, he seemed to 
suggest that immunity did not apply because torture is jus cogens and a 
crime against humanity. 43Later, he indicated that the immunity existed 
prior to the Torture Convention, but simultaneously acknowledged that 
torture was an international crime of jus cogens character at that time. 
44 
His rationale for the conclusion that immunity subsisted up until the 
Torture Convention was that it was only after the Torture Convention that 
torture could be considered a "fully constituted international crime". He 
4 1 Pinochet no 3, above n I, per Lord Browne Wilkinson, 844; Lord Hope of Craighead, 
886; Lord Saville ofNewdigate, 903 ; Lord Millet: 905 and 913 ; Lord Phillips, 916. 
42 The Genocide Convention applies to "constitutionally responsible rulers, public 
officials, or private individuals". However the Convention's absence of immunity does 
not necessarily extend to genocide tried in foreign domestic courts, as the Convention 
does not empower States Parties to prosecute genocide extraterritorially. 
43 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 846. 
44 Pinochet no 3, above n 1, 848 . 
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suggested that in order for an international cnme to become "fully 
constituted" it needs "some form of universal jurisdiction" and said that the 
Torture Convention provided that missing mechanism. Notwithstanding 
his views on the need for "universal jurisdiction" Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
did not restrict the absence of immunity ratione materiae to acts of torture. 
When making his observations that torture was not a fully constituted 
international crime prior to the Torture Convention, Lord Browne 
Wilkinson said "at that stage there was no international tribunal to punish 
torture and no general jurisdiction to permit or require its punishment in 
domestic courts", thereby suggesting that the existence of an international 
criminal tribunal may create the requisite universal jurisdiction. The Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 sets up such a tribunal, to 
prosecute, inter alia, crimes against humanity. Accordingly, all crimes 
against humanity could be fully constituted international crimes under Lord 
Brown Wilkinson's criteria. Immunity ratione materiae would not attach 
to crimes against humanity committed after the signing of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. 45 
45 It is also arguable that immunity ratione materiae would subsist until the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court came into force, which occurs following deposit of 
the 60th instrument of ratification. At 16 September 1999 there were 86 signatories and 4 
ratifications. <http://www.iccnow.org> 
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Lord Hope of Craighead accepted the reasoning of Lord Slynn of Hadley
46 
from the first House of Lords judgment, that in order for immupity ratione 
materiae to be unavailable to a person accused of a crime, the state 
asserting and the state being asked to refuse immunity must each be party 
to a Convention defining the act as a crime at international law and 
empowering the state to prevent or prosecute the crime extraterritorially. In 
countries such as the United Kingdom where conventions are not self 
executing, the Convention must also have been incorporated into domestic 
law.47 He also considered that the crime must have been committed as part 
f . 1· 48 o a systematic po icy. The effect of this reasoning would be that 
immunity rationae materiae is only dislodged where the crime in question 
is systematic torture or apartheid, and the parties to the proceedings are 
signatories to and have implemented the terms of the relevant convention 
(ie. the Torture Convention or the Apartheid Convention). This is because 
those are the only Conventions that set up universal domestic jurisdiction 
for crimes against humanity.
49 Similarly, Lord Saville of Newdigate said 
that Chile, Spain and Britain, by becoming parties to the Torture 
46 The fact that Lord Hope of Craighead quoted Lord Slynn of Hadley is itself of interest 
in that it provides authority to the first House of Lords judgment. 
47 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 882. 
48 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 886. 
49 Article 4(b) of the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid 1973 requires states to adopt legislation to bring to trial persons accused of 
apartheid, whether or not they reside the territory of the state in which the acts oare 
committed. Under art 5, persons who have committed apartheid may be tried by any 
state party which may acquire jurisdiction over the person. The Genocide Convention 
does not empower states parties to prosecute genocide extraterritorially (see Article 6 
which says persons shall be tried in the territory where the act was committed or by an 
international penal tribunal accepted by the contracting parties). However article 4 of the 
Genocide Convention expressly applies the Convention to officials and rulers . 
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Convention, had agreed to an exception to the general rule of immunity 
ratione materiae - suggesting that immunity ratione materiae would 
continue to apply to other crimes against humanity. 
Lords Millet and Phillips took the most expansive approach. Lord Millet 
considered that internationally criminal acts committed by a sovereign 
power by their very nature attract individual criminal responsibility.50 He 
expressed the view that universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity 
has existed since "well before 1984". He summed up his decision by 
saying "[i]n future, those who commit atrocities against civilian 
populations must expect to be called to account if fundamental human 
rights are to be properly protected. In this context, the exalted rank of the 
accused can afford no defence". Lord Phillips concluded "if Senator 
Pinochet behaved as Spain alleged, then the entirety of his conduct was a 
violation of the norms of international law. He can have no immunity for 
prosecution for any crime that formed part of that campaign. "51 Both 
judgments are therefore clear authority for the proposition that immunity 
ratione materiae is not available for any crime against humanity. Lord 
50 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 914. 
51 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 925 . Lord Phillips ' earlier statements, however, are not 
entirely consistent with this conclusion. For example at 924 he suggests that if the 
Genocide Convention had not expressly held responsible rulers and public officials liable, 
an issue could have been raised as to whether the jurisdiction conferred by the 
Convention was subject to immunity ratione materiae. 
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Hutton appears to favour a similar approach, implying that immunity is 
unavailable for any international crime. 
52 
Thus, the majority of the Law Lords were of the view that immunity 
ratione materiae carmot be invoked in respect of any cnme against 
humanity. This may pave the way for the future indictment, in domestic 
jurisdictions, of state agents, and former Heads of State who have 
committed crimes against humanity. 
(2) The treatment of murder charges 
The Law Lords ' views on whether Pinochet was immune to charges of 
murder are, however, also relevant to the question of whether the decision 
on the unavailability of immunity for torture is applicable to other crimes 
against humanity. The prosecution did not argue that immunity was 
unavailable to Pinochet for the charges of murder and conspiracy to 
murder. 53 Nevertheless Lord Phillips held that immunity did not exist for 
conspiracy to murder as the entirety of his conduct formed part of a 
campaign that violated international law. 
54 Lord Millet reached the same 
conclusion, although not because conspiracy to murder on the scale alleged 
was a crime against humanity but because it took place in Spain, the forum 
52 P inochet no 3, above n I, 900-90 I. 
53 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 848. 
54 Pinochet no 3, above n I , 925, 927. 
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country. 55 The other majority Law Lords held that Pinochet had immunity 
in respect of the murder charges. 56 
There is considerable tension between the decision of Lords Browne 
Wilkinson and Hutton that immunity existed for murder, and their 
conclusion that immunity was unavailable for torture, given that the stated 
rationale for their conclusion on torture could be extended to all crimes 
against humanity. This is because systematic murder has been clearly 
categorised as a crime against humanity since the Nuremberg Tribunal. 57 
The Law Lords should therefore have assessed whether the murder had 
been committed on such as scale as to constitute a crime against humanity. 
If the answer was in the affirmative, then applying their own reasoning, 
immunity should have been unavailable on these charges. 
It is regrettable that the prosecution failed to argue that immunity was 
unavailable for murder. Such an argument would have required the Law 
Lords to address expressly the issue of whether immunity was available for 
any crime against humanity. Consideration of that question may have 
resulted in a more definitive ratio decedendi in favour of the proposition 
that former Heads of State are not immune from any crime against 
humanity. The weakness of the judgment on the murder issue may dilute 
55 Pinochet no 3, above n I, 913. 
56 Pinochet no 3, above n I, per Lord Browne Wilkinson, 848; Lord Hope, 887; Lord 
Hutton, 888; Lord Saville (by inference), 904. 
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the impact of the majority reasoning pointing to the absence of immunity 
for any crime against humanity. 
(3) Liability of sitting Heads of State 
The issue of the liability of sitting Heads of State was dealt with only 
briefly. Five of the six majority judges said that sitting Heads of State 
were immune from any form of civil or criminal suit. They were 
technically correct under United Kingdom domestic law. Section 20(1) of 
the State Immunity Act 1978 has the effect of rendering Heads of State 
"inviolable", by importing and applying to Heads of State diplomatic 
immunities under article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations 1961. However at international law the situation is much less 
clear cut, and the Law Lords did not distinguish between domestic and 
international law when asserting the inviolability of an incumbent 
sovereign. 
The Law Lords relied on the views of prominent commentator Sir Arthur 
Watts to assist them in their arguments that former Heads of State who 
commit international crimes are not subject to immunity.
58 However Sir 
Arthur does not distinguish between sitting and former Heads of State 
57 This was confirmed last year by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
58 Pinochet no 3, above n 1, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 846, Lord Hope of Craighead, 881 
and 886, Lord Hutton 888, Lord Phillips 919. 
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when concluding that "as a matter of general customary international law a 
Head of State will personally be liable to be called to account if there is 
sufficient evidence that he authorised or perpetrated such serious 
international crimes."59 This was not acknowledged in the judgment. 
History demonstrates that both sitting and former Heads of State have in 
practice been considered liable by the international community for 
international crimes committed. The first person to be held accountable for 
crimes against international peace was the former German Emperor, Kaiser 
Wilhelm II, who was indicted after the World War One. 60 In 1945, the 
allies were planning to bring Hitler to justice while he was still Head of 
S . G 61 tate m ermany. Government officials in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have frequently stated that the current Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein should be brought to justice. Likewise, a raft of 
international instruments, from the Nuremberg Charter 1946 to the Statute 
of the International Criminal Court 1998 extend criminal responsibility to 
Heads of State.62 The liability of sitting Heads of State for international 
59 Watts, above n 37, 84. 
60 Shigeru Oda "The Individual in International Law" in Max Sorensen (ed) Manual of 
Public International law (Macmillan, New York, 1968) 469,515. 
61 United Kingdom: The Pinochet case, above n 8, 24. 
62 Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1946, 
Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, art IV of the Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948), Principle III of the Principles of Law 
Recognised in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the Judgment of the Tribunal 
(1950); art 3 of the UN Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind (1954), art 7(2) of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, art 6(2) of the Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda 1994, art 7 of the UN Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of 
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crimes was forcefully confirmed two months after the Pinochet decision, 
when the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia issued 
a warrant for the arrest of the President of the Federal Republic of 
Y 1 · .:'. · 63 ugos av1a 1or war cnmes. 
All the cases and instruments above involve the punishment of sitting 
Heads of State by international tribunals rather than domestic courts. It is 
therefore important to establish whether there is a valid policy or legal 
basis for a distinction between the liability of a Head of State before a 
domestic court and an international tribunal. 
Legal commentators do not appear to have addressed the specific question 
of whether there should be a distinction between domestic and 
international prosecution of Heads of State for international crimes. 
However the Nuremberg Tribunal, which had express jurisdiction over 
Heads of State6
4 is described by legal commentators as having been a joint 
exercise, by the four states which established it, of a jurisdictional right 
which each was entitled to exercise separately in accordance with 
international law. 
65 This suggests that the individual states each possessed 
Mankind 1996, and most recently art 27 of the Statute for the International Criminal 
Court 1998. 
63 The Prosecutor of the Tribunal v Slobodan Milosovic . Warrant of Arrest/ Order for 
Surrender, 24 May 1999, Case No. IT-99-37-1. 
64 Article 7 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
65 See for example Oppenheim 's International law Val ff (7 ed, Longman Group UK 
Ltd, Essex, 1952) 580-581 . 
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the right to override the immunity of a Head of State who had committed 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
From a policy perspective it may be argued that Head of State immunity 
before foreign courts is necessary to guard against political problems that 
might result in the state from which the leader originates if he or she were 
arrested overseas. However this argument is problematic. First, if the 
leader is committing crimes against humanity, the political void might have 
a stabilising rather than a destabilising effect on the regime. In the event, 
however, that the leadership vacuum did create instability, the jurisdiction 
in which the Head of State was being tried would be of marginal if any 
relevance. 
A stronger basis for creating a distinction between the liability of a Head of 
State before a domestic court and an international tribunal is the possible 
political repercussions for the prosecuting state. This basis, however, is 
also not persuasive. The punishment of perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity is a fundamental concern of the international community. Thus, 
any political or diplomatic difficulties that might face a government who 
prosecutes a Head of State should not be used to justify impunity. The 
application of Head of State immunity in the context of a crime against 
humanity is wholly incompatible with the rationale behind Head of State 
immunity. As crimes against humanity are viewed as an attack on the 
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international order, the prosecuting state can be seen as operating on behalf 
of the international community rather than in its usual role as a municipal 
jurisdiction of equal status to other states. Furthermore, the "dignity" and 
"mystique" of a sovereign are irretrievably eroded when he or she commits 
crimes against humanity. Arguments that they need to be protected in that 
context cannot therefore reasonably be sustained. 
Thus it is suggested that it is difficult to see a sound basis in policy or at 
international law for distinguishing between the liability of sitting Heads of 
State before domestic and international jurisdictions. In the context of 
crimes against humanity, international and domestic jurisdictions can be 
seen as an interlocking web, the purpose of which is to ensure that 
perpetrators find no safe haven. The need to prosecute crimes against 
humanity is the greatest where the accused is a sitting Head of State. To 
punish the person with ultimate control over the regime is the only 
effective means to end the crimes. 
The Pinochet case would have been an ideal context in which to deal with 
the issue of sitting Heads of State. A strong obiter statement as to the 
liability of sitting Heads of State could have been made without the 
potential adverse political consequences associated with an actual case. 
Such a statement would have sent a warning to all sitting Heads of State 
that crimes against humanity will not go unpunished, thereby setting in 
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place a strong self executing accountability mechanism and deterrent 
against future abuses. It would also have avoided the main potential 
negative consequence of the judgment, ie. that criminal Heads of State 
might be reluctant to cede power and give up their absolute immunity. 
The pronouncements on the inviolability of sitting Head of State, however, 
should not be afforded significant precedential value, as Pinochet was not a 
sitting Head of State, and the British statutory scheme underlay the 
conclusion. They do not detract from the groundbreaking decision that 
immunity is unavailable for former Heads of State who commit torture and 
other crimes against humanity. 
C Extradition 
If Senator Pinochet could not rely on Head of State immunity to prevent 
his extradition, the question still remained as to whether he was liable to be 
extradited for the crimes he was alleged to have committed. In the view of 
the majority, he was only liable to be extradited for torture after 1988, 
when extraterritorial torture was made a statutory offence in the United 
Kingdom. 
This section of the paper argues that the Law Lords: 66 
66 Other than Lord Millet. 
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1. Took an unduly restrictive interpretation of s2 of the Extradition Act 
1989 (UK) in deciding that the date that the offence needed to have 
been criminal in Britain was the date of the act rather than the date of 
the extradition request; and 
2. Failed to consider underlying international legal norms that could have 
permeated the domestic statutory scheme, thereby facilitating his 
extradition on all counts of torture. 
(I) The decision on extradition 
The point that the lawyers for Pinochet argued at the new hearing, that was 
considered to be the pivot upon which the case turned, was the absence of 
the requisite "double criminality" in respect of the torture charges. Under 
the generally accepted international principles of extradition law, the state 
with the alleged criminal in its territory will not extradite unless the crime 
alleged to have been committed is a crime within its own jurisdiction. The 
laws of the United Kingdom reflect this principle. A primary purpose 
behind that rule is encapsulated in the concept "nulla poena sine lega" or 
"no punishment without law".
67 In other words, it is contrary to justice for 
67 Sharon A Williams, "The Double Criminality Rule and Extradition: A Comparative 
Analysis" (1991) 15 Nov L Rev, 581 , 582. 
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State A to agree to extradite a person to State B if the person concerned 
was going to be punished for an act that State A did not consider illegal. 
(2) The issue 
It is necessary to explain in some detail the provisions of the Extradition 
Act 1989 (UK), since the minute construction of its terms resulted in the 
decision that extradition could not be effected for the majority of the 
charges. 
The Extradition Act 1989 defines "extradition crimes" m section 2. 
Section 2(1 )(b) has a specific definition relating to extraterritorial 
extradition crimes, ie crimes committed outside the territory of the United 
Kingdom. Accordingly, under the Act, both the criminal act in question, as 
well as the jurisdictional basis for the criminality of that act are relevant to 
the question of double criminality. 
The acts at issue were torture committed outside Spain, and Spain was 
asserting an extraterritorial right to try the torture. Thus, the criminal 
offence that needed to exist in the United Kingdom law was extraterritorial 
torture. 
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Section 2(1 )(b) of the Extradition Act 1989 defines extraterritorial 
extradition crimes as follows : 
(b) an extra-territorial offence against the law of a foreign 
state which is punishable under that law with 
imprisonment for a term of 12 months, or any greater 
punishment, and which satisfies -
(i) the condition specified in subsection (2) below; 
The issue lay in the "condition" referred to in s2( 1 )(b )(ii) that needs to be 
satisfied in order for the offence in question to be an "extraterritorial 
crime" . Section 2(2) defines the "condition" as follows: 
"(2) The condition mentioned in subsection (1 )(b )(i) above 
is that in corresponding circumstances equivalent conduct 
would constitute an extra-territorial offence against the law 
of the United Kingdom punishable with imprisonment for a 
term of 12 months, or any greater punishment." 
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(3) Pinochet 's arguments 
Pinochet's lawyers argued that the words "would constitute an 
extraterritorial offence" ( which are also used in s2( 1 )(a) in respect of 
intraterritorial offences) should be read as requiring the relevant date for 
considering whether the offence was criminal in Britain to be the date of 
the offence itself, rather than the date of the extradition request. 
The relevance of that argument is that torture was not a statutory 
extraterritorial offence in Britain until the passage of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. After Britain had acceded to the Torture Convention, torture 
was expressly criminalised under sl 34 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
To create the requisite universal jurisdiction for torture, the section 
encompassed torture committed outside Britain as well as domestic torture. 
However the crimes to which the extradition request related almost 
exclusively to events prior to 1988. The question of whether the 
Extradition Act required the offence to be criminal in Britain at the date of 
the extradition request or the crime was therefore considered a central 
issue. 
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(4) The majority view 
In considering this issue, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who delivered the main 
judgment on the extradition question, observed that the words "would 
constitute an offence . . . " in the Extradition Act "read more easily" as 
relating to a hypothetical occurrence in the United Kingdom at the time of 
the extradition request than at the time of the criminal act. He nevertheless 
chose to go beyond the section, and looked to the broader scheme of the 
Act. The factor that he considered most persuasive, in leading him to the 
conclusion that the relevant date was the date of conduct of the offence, 
was that the Act which preceded the Extradition Act 1989, the Extradition 
Act 1870, contained a list of extradition crimes to be construed according 
to "the law existing in England ... at the date of the alleged crime". Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson concluded that the lack of reference in the travaux 
preparatoires of the 1989 Act to the need to change the date demonstrated 
that Parliament must have intended that the date (ie . the time of 
commission of the offence) remain the same in the new Act. He suggested 
it was "impossible" that Parliament could have intended to change the date 
"by side wind and without investigation". 
This restrictive construction of the Extradition Act meant that Pinochet 
could only be extradited for torture occurring after 1988. 
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(5) International law on extradition for crimes against humanity 
The decision not to extradite Pinochet for torture prior to 1988 did not 
breach the Torture Convention as interpreted by the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture.68 The Committee decided in 1989 in the 
context of three communications by the relatives of Argentinians torture 
victims seeking to overturn an Act that predated the Convention, that the 
Convention does not have retroactive effect. They held that "torture for the 
purposes of the Convention can only mean torture that occurs subsequent 
to the entry into force of the Convention". 69 
In spite of the apparent consistency of the decision with the Torture 
Convention, there are arguably international legal principles that underlie 
the Torture Convention that support an application of extradition laws to 
facilitate Pinochet's prosecution for all counts of torture. In that regard it 
is important to note that the Torture Committee, in the context of the 1988 
decision stated that prior to the entry into force of the Convention 
international law already obliged "all states to take effective measures to 
prevent torture and to punish acts of torture."70 The Committee considered 
68 If the Convention was been retroactive art 7 would have been breached. The Law 
Lords did not discuss the Torture Convention in the context of the extradition question . 
69 Communications Nos 1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/ 1988, Report of the Committee Against 
Torture, United Nations, New York 1990, 112. 
70
Report of the Committee Against Torture, above n 69, 112. A distinction between 
preexisting international law and the Torture Convention was acknowledged in the 
preamble to the Torture Convention, which refers to international laws banning torture 
that predated the Convention, (Article 5 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, 
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that the law in question (guaranteeing impunity for certain military) was 
incompatible with the spirit and purpose of the Convention, and that the 
Argentinean government had a "moral obligation" to compensate relatives 
of the victims. 
There is naissant support at international law for the notion that states have 
a duty to facilitate prosecution of all crimes against humanity. The 
orthodox view has been that States have a right to prosecute crimes against 
humanity. 71 Some commentators, however, consider the need to punish the · 
perpetrators of }us cogens crimes is so fundamental that States are subject 
to an obligatio erga omnes or non derogable duty to prosecute or extradite 
them. 72 There is strong argument to suggest that the recent adoption of the 
and Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights), and states as a 
purpose of the Convention the "[desire] to make more effective the struggle against 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment throughout the world ." The 
Handbook on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment reinforces this point as follows: 
"Many people assume that the Convention ' s principal aim is to outlaw torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. This assumption is not correct 
insofar as it would imply that the prohibition of these practices is established under 
international law by the Convention only and that this prohibition will be binding as a 
rule of international law only for those states which have become parties to the 
Convention. On the contrary, the Convention is based on the recognition that the above-
mentioned practices are already outlawed under international law. The principal aim of 
the Convention is to strengthen the existing prohibition by a number of supportive 
measures." Above n 29, I. 
71 Christopher C Joyner "Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction in 
Bringing War Criminals to Accountability" (I 994) 59: 4 Law & Contemp Probs, 169. 
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds) Oppenheim 's International law (9 ed, Longman 
Group UK Ltd, Essex, 1992) 998. 
72 For Example "Jus cogens and Obligatio erga omnes", above n 31, 65-66, "United 
Kingdom, The Pinochet Case", above n 8, 9; Bassiouni and Wise, above n34, 112-131. 
The "erga omnes" principle has been referred to by the International Court of Justice in 
the following cases: Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Ltd (Belg v Spain} 1970 
!CJ 3 (Feb 5), Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 has significantly 
increased momentum towards the existence of such an obligation. 73 There 
has also been very recent judicial endorsement of the principle. In 
September, the Federal Court of Australia unreservedly accepted the 
existence of an obligatio erga ornnes in the context of genocide. 74 
In 1985, the French Court of Cassation endorsed a firm statement by the 
French Court of Appeal which provides guidance as to how the obligatio 
erga omnes principle might impact on municipal extradition laws. The 
Court of Appeal stated, in the context of an appeal by a former Gestapo 
agent against his detention by French agents that "crimes against humanity 
. .. are subject to an international criminal order to which the notions of 
frontiers and extradition rules arising therefrom are completely foreign." 75 
That case should not be seen as authority for the proposition that the state 
being asked to extradite is entitled to ignore extradition laws, not least 
because it related to the legality of a de facto extradition that had already 
Genocide I 95 I ICJ Rep I 5 (May 28); South West Africa Cases (Preliminary Objections) 
Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa I 963 ]CJ Rep 319 (Dec 21 ). 
73 
Jn 1997 M Cherif Bassiouni wrote "it is still uncertain in ICL [international criminal 
Jaw) whether the inclusion of a crime in the category of )us cogens creates rights or, as 
stated above, non-derogable duties erga omnes. The establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court having inherent jurisdiction over these crimes would be a 
convincing argument for the proposition that crimes such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes are part ofjus cogens and that obligations erga omnes to 
prosecute or extradite flow from them." "Jus cogens and Ob/igatio Erga Omnes " above n 
31, 74. 
74 Nu/yarimma v Thompson [ 1999) FCA 1192, 21 
<http: //www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ct/1999/ 1192.htrnl> 21 per Merkel J. 
-
5 Federation Nationa/e Des Deportes et lnternes Resistants et Patriotes and Others v 
Barbie Court ofCassation Criminal Chamber (1985) 87 ILC Lauterpacht, 125, 130. 
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been effected by the French Government. 
76 However it underlines, in a 
general sense, the fundamental concern that the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity is to the international community, and suggests that 
municipal extradition laws should not operate to obstruct that goal. 
(6) Alternative approaches to the extradition question 
There were three approaches that the Law Lords could have adopted, 
consistent with domestic and international extradition laws and the· 
obligatio erga omnes principle, that would have ensured that Pinochet was 
extradited for all counts of torture. These were: 
1. Resolution of the ambiguity in the Extradition Act m favour of double 
criminality. 
2. Retroactive application of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. 
3. Importation of customary international law. 
(a) Resolution of ambiguity in favour of double criminality 
Lord Browne Wilkinson's interpretation of s2(2) of the Extradition Act 
1989, adopted by all the Law Lords, is open to question. Lord Browne-
76 For other examples of de facto extraditions (including Adolf Eichmann) see I A 
Shearer Extradition in International law (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1971 , 73 . 
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Wilkinson considered that Parliament could not have intended to change 
the date at which the act needed to be criminal (viz the date of the act 
itself) because the travaux preparatoires did not mention an intention to 
make such a change. However it is equally arguable that the removal of a 
reference in the 1989 Act of a reference to a requirement for extradition 
crimes to be criminal in English law "at the date of the alleged crime" 
removed the requirement for the crime to be criminal in Britain at the time 
of its commission. This interpretation seems logical when viewed in the 
context of Lord Browne Wilkinson's comment that the words of s2(2) 
"read more easily" as the date of the extradition request. Such an 
interpretation would be consistent the "nulla poena sine lege" purpose of 
the double criminality rule. Extraterritorial torture is currently unlawful in 
Britain, and therefore to extradite for such a crime to a country which 
criminalised it earlier would not therefore appear to be contrary to British 
. f. . 77 not10ns o Justice. The obligatio erga omnes principle would suggest 
that the ambiguity ought to have been resolved in favour of extradition, 
given that legislative ambiguities are to be construed where possible in 
d . h . . 11 78 accor ance wit mtemat10na aw. 
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An alternative rule of interpretation might also have been invoked. Under that rule, if a 
statute is ambiguous, regard might be had to the consequences of the alternative 
construction . The general rule is that where statutes are clear, the particular 
consequences in the case before the judges may not be considered. Where a statute is 
ambiguous, the consequences of the alternative construction may be regarded. Halsburys 
Laws of England, (4 ed, Butterworths, London) 548-549. 
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Halsburys laws of England (4 ed, Butterworths, London) 559. For a general 
discussion of British interpretation of international laws see Tom Rensen "British 
Statutory Interpretation in Light of Community and Other International Obligations" 
(1993) 14 Stat Law Rev, 186. For the American situation see Ralph G Steinhardt "The 
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(b) Retroactive application of the Criminal Justice Act 
The judges presupposed the prospectivity of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, 
thereby overlooking a potential basis for securing Pinochet' s extradition on 
all counts of torture: to apply retrospectively s134 of the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. 
Numerous international treaties prima facie prohibit retroactive criminal 
laws. Article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states 
"No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or 
omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time when it was committed". Articles 15 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 7(1) of the 
European Convention of Human Rights mirror that provision. The rule 
derives from the notion that people should be able to determine the 
boundaries of legality and adapt their actions in accordance with those 
boundaries. 79 It is intended to protect people from punishment for acts 
which they believed to be lawful. However acts that are offences at 
international law are not covered by the prohibition. Thus, a person may 
be held guilty under domestic law for a preexisting offence at international 
role oflntemational Law As a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction" ( 1990) 43 :
4 
Vand LR 1103. 
79 Rupert Ticehurst " Retroactive Criminal Law" (1998-99) 9 Kings College LJ , 89. 
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law, even if it was not a penal offence under domestic law at the time of 
commission. 
United Kingdom law operates on the principle that penal statutes are not to 
be applied retrospectively. This principle derives from common law.80 
However the principle is a presumption only, and has occasionally been 
dislodged. 81 The Law Lords were therefore neither constrained by statute, 
precedent, nor international law from holding that s 134 of the Criminal 
Justice Act applied retroactively to criminalise extraterritorial torture prior 
to 1988. 
It is strongly arguable that if an individual's act constitutes an offence that 
is subject to universal jurisdiction as a matter of international law, and that 
jurisdiction has been incorporated in domestic law after committal of the 
offence, the presumption against retroactivity ought to be dislodged.82 
This is because the statute is merely codifying an existing international 
80 The Interpretation Act 1978 (UK) is silent on the issue. 
81 An example is the 1992 case of R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 in which the common law 
defence of marital relations to statutory rape was removed. This was challenged before 
the European Court of Human Rights, as being contrary to Article 7 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which proscribes retroactive criminalisation of offences. 
In its decision upholding the judgment, the Court was influenced significantly by the 
severity of the offence of rape, saying "the essentially debasing character of rape is so 
manifest" CR v United Kingdom, No 20 I 90/92 ( 1995) 21 EHRR, 363 , 402 . In Shaw v 
DPP [1962] AC 220, the common law offence of"conspiracy to corrupt public morals" 
was created. 
The War Crimes Act 1991 (UK) is Britain's only retroactive criminal statute. This 
extends to United Kingdom Courts jurisdiction over murder, manslaughter, and culpable 
homicide committed in German territory during the Second World War. 
82 See Kevin J Liss "The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes" ( 1987) 87 Columb L R l 515 , 1528. 
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crime and not creating a new offence. 
83 Given that the crimes to which 
universal jurisdiction applies, namely war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, are generally considered to be of such severity as to constitute 
an attack on the international legal order, the rationale underlying the rule 
against retroactivity has little relevance. The person who commits such 
acts cannot reasonably believe them to be legal at the time of 
· · 84 comm1ss1on. 
In countries where customary international law forms part of the common 
law, that approach is even more compelling, as a common law crime 
preexisted the statutory crime. 
Thus, it is suggested that the Law Lords could legitimately have held that 
s 134 of the Criminal Justice Act had retroactive effect, on the basis that 
there was at international law, and arguably domestic law, universal 
jurisdiction for torture prior to 1988, and that s134 of the Criminal Justice 
Act simply codified that law. 
( c) Importation of customary international law 
83 Compare Justice Robert Jackson "Report of June 7 1945" 39 Am J lnt' I L 178,187 
(Supp 1945), in which the retroactive application of the Nuremberg statute was justified 
by the Chief of Council for the United States on the basis that international law is not 
capable of legislative development so could not grow unless new principles were adopted 
and applied. 
48 
An alternative approach, which also involved invoking the principle of 
universal jurisdiction, was taken by Lord Millet. His view was that torture 
was an extraterritorial crime in Britain prior to 1988 under the common 
law. 
There were two limbs to his reasoning: 
1. That universal jurisdiction existed at customary international law for 
torture prior to 1988. 
2. That customary international law automatically forms part of the 
common law of the United Kingdom. 
Lord Millet reasoned that the crime of torture was an extraterritorial crime 
in Britain well before 1973, in spite of the absence of a legislative 
provision to that effect. He was of the view that universal jurisdiction 
existed for all crimes against humanity at the time of the Nuremburg 
Tribunal, and it was only the language of the Nuremberg Charter, that 
restricted the scope of its jurisdiction in respect of crimes against humanity 
to those committed in connection with war crimes. 85 The finding that 
universal jursidiction existed for torture and other crimes against humanity 
84 Liss, above n 82, 1529. 
85 Pinochet No 3, above n I, 909. 
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at the time of Nuremberg is a progressive interpretation of customary 
. . 11 h . 86 mternat1ona aws at t at time. 
In drawing his conclusion, Lord Millet invoked the "incorporationist" 
doctrine of international law, under which customary international law is 
imported directly into the common law without need for an implementing 
domestic statute. This doctrine facilitates domestic consistency with human 
rights as it enables ongoing and direct implementation of evolving 
international norms in national jurisprudence without the need for law 
changes. His Lordship did not see the need to traverse the authorities in 
drawing the conclusion, in spite of some inroads into the doctrine in United 
Kingdom case law.
87 His definitive statement that "[ c ]ustomary 
international law is part of the common law" may well assist in settling the 
doctrine, and will be a strong precedent for future direct incorporation of 
international human rights and other laws into common law jurisdictions. 
86 Joyner, above n 71 , 160 has similar views. Compare Brownlie, above n3 l , 566-567, 
Tristan Gilbertson "Legal Implications of the Presence of Nazi War Criminals in New 
Zealand" (1988-91) 6 Auck L R, 552, 556-557. 
Lord Millet consolidated his reasoning on which crimes attract universal jurisdiction into 
a useful formula. He held that all international crimes attracts universal jurisdiction if the 
crime is jus cogens and has been committed on a serious scale. He said torture and 
genocide are the most serious crimes against humanity, and that torture has been 
expressly prohibited at least since 1948, when the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights came into effect. Lord Millet's formulation of crimes that attract universal 
jurisdiction is likely to become an important tenet of international law, and has already 
been referred to by Merkel J in the Australian Federal Court genocide case of 
Nulyarimma v Thompson, above n74 at 28. 
87 See Brownlie, above n 32, 42-47. 
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III THE NEW ZEALAND SITUATION 
What, then, is the position in New Zealand. If Pinochet arrived tomorrow 
in New Zealand, could he be prosecuted in New Zealand or extradited to 
Spain for crimes against humanity? 
This part of the paper analyses the New Zealand statutory framework and 
common law on sovereign immunity, crimes against humanity, and 
extradition. 
A Immunity 
(I) Sovereign immunity 
In contrast with the United Kingdom, New Zealand does not have 
legislation governing state or Head of State immunity. Sovereign 
immunity is part of the common law. The leading case on sovereign 
. . . G ,+ p· . S 88 1mmun1ty 1s overnor o1 ltcairn v utton. In that case Cooke P 
expressed the pararnouncy of international law in respect of matters such as 
sovereign immunity, going so far as to state that "a general statute, 
however apparently comprehensive, is not to be interpreted as contrary to 
international law on such matters as sovereign immmunity. Some 
88 Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton [1995] I NZLR 426. 
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sufficiently plain positive indication is required to produce such a result."
89 
Sovereign immunity was held in that case to form part of New Zealand 
law, thereby precluding a New Zealand based employee of the British 
Government from seeking relief under the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 . 
(2) Head of State immunity 
There is no specific case law in New Zealand on the immunity of Heads of 
State. In Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton Richardson J indicated that New 
Zealand would apply British common law on sovereign immunity unless 
local factors or policy considerations weighed against its application.
90 
This suggests that New Zealand would be likely to follow the Pinochet 
decision on the liablity of former Heads of State for crimes against 
humanity. 
Unlike in the United Kingdom, New Zealand courts would not be 
constrained by domestic legislation from holding a sitting Head of State 
accountable for a crime against humanity. In Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton 
Richardson J endorses international law as a source of New Zealand 
common law,
91 and states "the Courts of New Zealand will always seek to 
89 Governor of Pitcarrn v Sutton, above n 88, 30. 
90 Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton, above n 88, 436. 
91 Governor General v Sutton, above n 88, 436. 
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develop and interpret our laws in accordance with generally accepted 
international rules and to accord with New Zealand's international 
obligations."92 It would thus be open to the courts to hold that sitting 
Heads of State are liable for international crimes under customary 
international law, and that this should be incorporated into New Zealand 
law through the common law.93 
(3) Other immunities 
If the New Zealand courts were to hold that a sitting Head of State was not 
immune from prosecution for a crime against humanity under customary 
international laws, the situation as between sitting Heads of State and 
diplomatic agents in office would be anomalous. A Diplomatic agent in 
New Zealand is subject to full legislative immunity. Similarly to the 
United Kingdom's Diplomatic Privileges Act, the Diplomatic Privileges 
and Immunities Act 1968 directly imports into New Zealand's laws the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. 94 Under Article 29 of the 
Convention,95 the person of the diplomatic agent shall be "inviolable"96 
92 Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton, above n 88,433. 
93 See Part IIl(B)(3). 
94 Section 5(1) ofthe Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968. 
95 Imported into NZ law by s5(1) of the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968. 
96 Compare s4(7)(d) of the Consular Privileges and Immunities Act 1971, in which 
immunity is only afforded to consular officers for crimes punishable with imprisonment 
for less than three years. This is more restrictive than the immunities afforded under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Article 41 (I) of that Convention provides 
that "Consular officers shall not be liable to arrest or detention pending trial, except in the 
case of a grave crime ... " 
53 
LAW LIBRARY 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
and under Article 31 of the Convention, a diplomatic agent enJoys 
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the rece1vmg state.
97 At 
international law, this immunity could arguably be overridden by the jus 
cogens laws against torture or other crimes against humanity. The 
Convention's direct statutory effect in New Zealand would, however, 
render an application of that argument to the New Zealand legal framework 
problematic. It would require considerable judicial creativity to allow 
international norms to permeate a domestic legal term as categorical as 
"inviolable". An argument could be made that the Diplomatic Privileges 
Act is intended to incorporate New Zealand's international obligations in 
their entirety on diplomatic privileges, (ie. the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations together with any applicable customary international 
law), therefore that New Zealand should interpret its terms in accordance 
97 
The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 contains a variety of situations in 
which immunities can be extended to international visitors. Under s 11 of the Act, if a 
Minister has doubts as to the extent to which immunities apply to representatives of 
Governments attending an international conference, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade can direct that the privileges and immunities of a diplomatic agent under the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, via Gazette notice. This discretion could be 
used for foreign conference attendees at any level, including a Head of State. The person 
concerned would therefore be, prima facie, inviolable (see arts 29 and 31 ). Such a notice 
was gazetted for the September 1999 APEC Heads of Government conference in 
Auckland. The Governor-General may also make orders providing that members of 
international organisations are immune from suit. These orders can either extend the 
same immunities from suit and legal process as a diplomatic agent (third Schedule) or 
immunity in respect of official functions only (fourth schedule). See e.g. (United 
Nations) Order 1959/51, (ILO) order 1959/54, (South Pacific Commission) Order 
1959/56. 
Under s 5(3) the Governor-General may declare that persons connected with a mission of 
a particular state have immunity from jurisdiction to give effect to a custom or 
agreement. See for example the Privileges and Immunities (Taipei Economic and 
Cultural Office) Order 1998 (SR 1998/339). 
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with the relevant international laws. 98 This would involve an expansive 
application of the interpretative rule that domestic legislation should be 
construed consistently with international law. 
( 4) Conclusion on immunity 
Accordingly, if Pinochet were to amve m New Zealand tomorrow he 
would not be immune from torture charges. He would also be unlikely to 
be immune for any other crimes against humanity for which the New 
Zealand courts have jurisdiction (see below). 
B Extraterritorial Prosecution/or Crimes Against Humanity 
(]) Statutory extraterritorial offences 
New Zealand ratified the Torture Convention in 1986 and has fully 
implemented its obligations under the Crimes of Torture Act 1989. Section 
3 of the Crimes of Torture Act 1989 gives the New Zealand courts 
98 Lord Cooke ' s principle in Governor of Pitcairn v Sutton, above n 88, 30, that a general 
statute should not be interpreted as being contrary to international law on an area such a 
sovereign immunity could be a starting point, but the principle would need to be 
considerably expanded. In that case the statute was of general effect. In contrast, in the 
situation outlined, the statutory provision is specific. Furthermore, the international legal 
principle that sitting Heads of State are liable is less solid than the general rule of 
sovereign immunity. 
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universal jurisdiction for crimes of torture. Thus torturers present in New 
Zealand territory can be prosecuted 
99 or extradited. 100 
Section 3 of the Geneva Conventions Act 1958 extends universal 
jurisdiction to the New Zealand courts for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed during armed conflict. 
101 
Dealing in slaves is the only other statutory cnme against humanity for 
which the New Zealand courts have universal jurisdiction.
102 
(2) Non statutory crimes against humanity 
99 Section 4(b) Crimes of Torture Act 1989. 
100 Section 8(1 ) Crimes of Torture Act 1989. 
IOI These encompass crimes committed in the course of war in the fonn of unlawful and 
wanton wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment including biological experiments, 
causing serious suffering or injury, extensive destruction and appropriation of property, 
compelling a prisoner of war or protected person to serve in the armed forces of the 
hostile power, depriving a prisoner of war the right to a fair trial, unlawful deportation 
transfer or confinement of a protected person, taking of hostages, endangering the 
physical or mental health of a party. See also Gilbertson, above n86, 553 . 
102 Section 98 Crimes Act 1961 . There is no statutory offence of genocide in New 
Zealand. New Zealand ratified the Genocide Convention in 1978. However the 
Genocide Convention does not require states parties to set up universal domestic 
jurisdiction for genocide. Under the International War Crimes Tribunal ' s Act 1995, New 
Zealand can, in response to a request for assistance from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
arrest and surrender persons suspect of committing genocide in Rwanda or the former 
Yugoslavia. Section 13 of the Act makes provision for the Tribunal to sit in New 
Zealand, so extraterritorial acts of genocide can in fact be tried within New Zealand ' s 
territory, albeit under international jurisdiction. Other international crimes for which the 
New Zealand courts have universal jurisdiction are hostage taking (Section 8 of the 
Crimes (Internationally Protected Persons, United Nations and Associated Personnel and 
Hostages) Act 1980, hijacking (s3 Aviation Crimes Act 1972), endangering the safety of 
an international airport (s5A Aviation Crimes Act 1972) and piracy (section 92 Crimes 
Act 1961). 
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New Zealand legislation on the face of it precludes the Courts from 
exercising universal jurisdiction for crimes against humanity through the 
common law. New Zealand criminal law has been fully codified since 
1893, 103 and common law offences, including offences under customary 
international law, have been "abolished".104 The current manifestation of 
this rule is section 9 of the Crimes Act, which says "no one shall be 
convicted of any offence at common law . . . ". Furthermore section 6 of the 
Crimes Act 1961 rules out extraterritorial prosecutions for statutory 
offences, unless such jurisdiction is expressly provided for. It says " ... no 
act done or committed outside New Zealand is an offence, unless it is an 
offence by virtue of any provision of this Act or any other enactment." 
The effect of these provisions 1s to exclude all extraterritorial cnmes 
against humanity committed during peacetime, other than torture and 
slavery, from the jurisdiction of the New Zealand courts. The cnmes 
concerned are widespread and sytematic: murder, extermination, 
deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other severe 
deprivation of physical liberty, grave sexual crimes, persecution on the 
grounds of political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender 
grounds, enforced disappearance, and apartheid. 
103 Maxwell and Bates Luxford's Police Law in New Zealand ( 4ed, Butterworths, 
Wellington, 1991)2. 
104 Section 6 of the Criminal Code Act 1893 was the first provision precluding conviction 
under the common law. This was replaced by s5 of the Crimes Act 1908. An 
explanatory note to s5 stated its purpose was "to abolish common law offences". 
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(3) Retroactive operation of statutory crimes 
The statutory extraterritorial crimes against humanity in New Zealand are 
prima facie precluded from having retroactive effect. The provisions 
concerned are neither expressly prospective or retrospective. However 
several legislative provisions preclude the retroactive operation of criminal 
legislation. 105 Section 1 OA of the Crimes Act 1961 precludes liability in 
criminal proceedings if the act in question did not constitute an "offence" 
at the time of commission.
106 "Offence" is defined as a statutory 
offence. 107 Similarly, section 26(1) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 provides 
that "no-one shall be liable to conviction of any offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute an offence by such person under 
the law of New Zealand at the time it occurred."
108 
The 1893 abolition of the common law as a source of New Zealand 
criminal law precludes the argument available in the United Kingdom that 
105 See Sim ester and Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (Brookers, Wellington, 
1998), 23-24. 
General legislation is also generally precluded from retroactive application under s 7 of 
the Interpretation Act 1999. 
106 Section 1 OA says "notwithstanding any other enactment or rule of law to the contrary, 
no person shall be liable in any criminal proceedings in respect of an act or omission by 
him, if, at the time of the act or omission, the act or omission by him did not constitute an 
offence." 
107 Section 2 defines offence as "any act or omission punishable under this Act or any 
other enactment" . 
108 For an application of s26( 1) see R v King ( 1995) 3 HRNZ 425, 426, HC (Hammond J). 
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the statutory cnmes against humanity codified pre-existing common law 
offences, as all the New Zealand provisions came into operation after 1893. 
(4) Consent of the Attorney General required for prosecution of 
torture 
Under s12(1) of the Crimes of Torture Act 1989, and s3(5) of the Geneva 
Conventions Act 1958 no proceedings for the trial and punishment of any 
person can proceed in the absence of the consent of the Attorney-
General.109 Such a provision is unusual but not unique110. The Attorney 
General generally, "as a matter of convention and sound politics, keeps 
entirely out of [prosecution] decisions". 111 In the unusual cases whether 
the Attorney General is required to consent to proceedings, in deciding 
whether to prosecute, the Attorney General must exercise independent 
109 It is unclear whether the requirement for the Attorney-General's consent under the 
Crimes of Torture Act is intended to apply just to prosecution, or whether it extends to 
extradition. The wording of section 12(1) is general, in that it refers to the requirement 
for consent in "proceedings for the trial and punishment of any person charged with a 
crime described in ... section 3" and therefore might encompass extradition proceedings. 
However section 12(2) (providing that a person may be arrested and remanded in custody 
pending the consent of the Attorney-General) refers to the consent being for "institution 
of prosecution" which might suggest that the consent of the Attorney General is required 
for domestic prosecution only, as proceedings for extradition do not necessarily amount 
to an "institution of prosecution". If the latter were intended, then the legislature did not 
anticipate that the political ramifications of an extradition can equal that of a domestic 
prosecution. 
110 Other examples are ss 132 and 135 of the Human Rights Act 1993 (inciting racial 
disharmony and discriminatory denial of access to public places), and s I OA of the Crimes 
Act (prosecution after 10 years of the date of the offence). 
111 GDS Taylor Judicial Review: a New Zealand Perspective (Butterworths, Wellington, 
1991) 22; Grant Huscroft "The Attorney-General, the Bill of Rights, and the Public 
Interest" in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act I 990 and the Human Rights Act I 993 (Brookers, Wellington, 
1995) 136. 
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judgment in the public interest, and not consult with his or her Cabinet 
colleagues. 112 The Attorney General's position as a member of Cabinet 
nevertheless creates the potential for the perception that political 
considerations might weigh into a decision on whether to prosecute or 
d. d 
. . 1113 extra 1te a suspecte torturer or war cnmma. 
In the absence to date of any prosecutions under the Crimes of Torture Act, 
it is not possible to predict the criteria the Attorney-General would apply in 
exercising the discretion to provide or withhold consent in respect of a 
. 1 . 114 part1cu ar prosecution. There is, however, case law which could 
suggest that a decision by the Attorney-General not to proceed with a 
prosecution could be subject to judicial review if matters extraneous to the 
alleged offences weighed into the decision. 
The case of Tavita v Minister of Immigration
115 considered the issue of 
whether the then Associate Minister of Immigration was required to 
consider the terms of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
112 Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law 
Book Company Limited, Sydney, I 993) 260. 
113 Section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act (UK) also requires the AG's consent in the 
prosecution for torture. In the UK, the AG is not a member of cabinet. The British 
Attorney General was asked twice by Amnesty International to authorise Pinochet's in 
the early 1990's, but Pinochet left the country before the decision had been made. Since 
Pinchet'-5 arrest in I 999, he has been asked on several occasions by Amnesty 
International to prosecute domestically, but declined. Geoffrey Bindman lessons of 
Pinochet (1999) July 9 New Law Journal, 1050. 
114 For a discussion of the role of the AG in prosecutions, see Huscroft and Rishworth, 
above nl I I, 133-136. 
115 Tavita v Minister of Immigration ( 1993) I HRNZ, 30. 
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Rights and the Optional Protocol thereto, and the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, in making decisions as to the immigration status of the 
applicant. Although no final decision was taken by the Court, Counsel for 
the Minister of Immigration's argument that the Minister and the New 
Zealand Immigration Service were entitled to ignore the international 
instruments was described by Cooke P as "unattractive". 116 Later he said 
that "a failure to give practical effect to international instruments to which 
New Zealand is a part [sic] may attract criticism. Legitimate criticism 
could extend to the New Zealand Courts if they were to accept the 
argument that, because a domestic statute giving discretionary powers in 
general terms does not mention international human rights, norms, or 
obligations, the Executive is necessarily free to ignore them". 117 He then 
went on to describe the judgment as "a case of possibly far reaching 
"fi · ,,118 ram1 1cat10ns. 
The subsequent cases of Puli 'uvea v Removal Review Authority119 and 
Lawson v Housing New Zealand1 20 have confirmed that relevant 
international instruments (in both cases the ICCPR and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child) must be taken into account when a statutory 
11 6 Tavita, above n 115, 40. 
117 Tavita, above n 115, 41. 
118 Tavita, above n 115, p4 l. 
119 Puli 'uvea v Removal Review Authority (1996) 2 NZHR 510. 
120 Lawson v Housing New Zealand ( 1996) 3 HRNZ 285 . 
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discretion is exercised. Those cases suggest, though, that consideration of 
the international principles may be sufficient discharge of the duty. 121 
The combined effect of these precedents is nevertheless, at a minimum, to 
render a decision by the Attorney-General to refuse consent of a 
prosecution under the Torture Convention susceptible to judicial review on 
the basis that insufficient regard was had to the provisions of the Torture 
Convention. It is arguable that the Torture Convention, being of a different 
nature to the conventions to which the Minister was to have regard in the 
cases to date, puts a higher onus of consideration on the Minister. Three 
reasons support such an approach. First, unlike in the precedents cited, the 
preamble to the Crimes of Torture Act makes it clear that the Act is 
specifically designed to implement the provisions of the Torture 
Convention, so the Convention is of fundamental relevance to the statutory 
discretion. Secondly, the Torture Convention, unlike the Conventions 
relevant to the decisions to date, places concrete practical obligations on 
States Parties thereto, to either prosecute or extradite suspected torturers. 
Thus failure to agree to prosecute such a person would be a direct breach 
of these obligations. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the 
Convention implements international norms of jus cogens nature, thus the 
subject matter of the Convention has the highest status at international law. 
121 Puli 'uvea, above n 119, 522 per Keith J). The case of Lawson v Housing New 
Zealand indicates that an attempt to balance relevant international instruments with 
competing considerations is sufficient discharge of the Tavita obligations. 
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(5) Conclusion on extraterritorial prosecution 
In light of the inability of the New Zealand courts to prosecute most crimes 
against humanity committed during peacetime, the only crime for which 
Pinochet could be prosecuted in New Zealand is torture, and then only for 
post 1989 charges. It would, however, be difficult for the Attorney 
General to withhold consent to the prosecution. 
C Extradition Laws 
(1) Double criminality 
Section 4 of the Extradition Act 1999, which came into force on 1 
September 1999, defines "extradition offence" as "an offence punishable 
under the law of an extradition country for which the maximum penalty is 
imprisonment for not less than 12 months." In order to meet double 
criminality requirements, the conduct needs to have amounted to an 
offence "punishable under the law of New Zealand" ... "if it had occurred 
within the jurisdiction of New Zealand". 122 
122 Section 4(2) Extradition Act 1999. 
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Unlike in the United Kingdom there is no ambiguity as to when the offence 
needs to have been criminal domestically: under s4(3) the offence must be 
an offence at New Zealand law at the date of the offence, and not the date 
f h d. · 123 o t e extra 1tlon request. 
(2) Extradition for statutory crimes against humanity 
Clearly, statutory cnmes against humanity committed after the 
extraterritorial statutory offences came into force would meet the definition 
of extradition crimes under the Extradition Act 1999.
124 Thus persons 
suspected of such crimes could be extradited to third states endeavouring to 
exercise universal jurisdiction against a non-national. 
Extradition for crimes that predated the statutory extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would not be possible, m light of the statutory scheme 
123 Under s4(3) extradition offences must meet the following condition. " ... if the conduct 
of the person constituting the offence in relation to the extradition country, or equivalent 
conduct, had occurred within the jurisdiction of New Zealand at the relevant time it 
would, if proved, have constituted an offence punishable under the law of New Zealand 
for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for not less than 12 months or any more 
severe penalty." 
124 The maximum penalty for torture, slavery, and war crimes or crimes against humanity 
in armed conflict is 14 years. (Section 3 Crimes of Torture Act 1989 (torture), section 98 
of the Crimes Act 1961 (slavery), s4(a) and 4(b) Geneva Conventions Act 1958 (war 
crimes). 
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discussed above which precludes the retroactive operation of criminal 
statutes. 
(3) Extradition for non statutory crimes against humanity 
The requirement under s4(1 )(b) of the Extradition Act 1999 for the offence 
subject to the extradition request to be punishable "under the law of New 
Zealand" creates problems for the extradition of non statutory crimes 
against humanity when universal jurisdiction is being exercised. This is 
because under the law of New Zealand, only statutory extraterritorial 
crimes against humanity are punishable. Thus double criminality would 
not exist for extradition requests relating to extraterritorial crimes against 
humanity not codified under New Zealand legislation. 
There is, however, some basis for arguing, consistent with the obligatio 
erga omnes principle, that the New Zealand courts having the power to 
extradite for all crimes against humanity, including where the requesting 
state was seeking to prosecute extraterritorially. This relates to the s4(2) 
requirement for the "conduct of the person" or "equivalent conduct" to 
have constituted an offence if it "had occurred within the jurisdiction of 
New Zealand' ( emphasis added), and applies the principle that legislative 
ambiguities are to be resolved in favour of international principles. It is 
arguable that in s4(2), "jurisdiction of New Zealand" means the territory of 
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New Zealand, as opposed to the scope of jurisdictional reach of New 
ii-Zealand courts. ' Under that approach, the jurisdictional basis for the 
crime would be irrelevant. 126 The only question would be whether the acts 
are an offence against New Zealand law with a maximum penalty of at 
least 12 months. Thus, New Zealand could potentially extradite an alleged 
offender when the requesting state was exercising universal jurisdiction for 
a crime against humanity, as there are legislative provisions under which 
cnmes against humanity, committed intraterritorially, could be 
prosecuted. 127 
( 4) Conclusion on extradition 
There is therefore more scope under New Zealand laws for extradition for 
extraterritorial crimes against humanity than there is for their prosecution 
125 See Oxford Dictionary of Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) 253 which has 
three definitions of Jurisdiction " I. The power of a court to hear and decide a case or 
make a certain order. 2. The territorial limits within which the jurisdiction of a court may 
be exercised. In the case of English courts this comprises England, Wales, Berwick upon 
Tweed, and those parts of the sea claimed as territorial waters. Everywhere else is said to 
be outside the jurisdiction. 3. The territorial scope of the legislative competence of 
Parliament. 
126 See Grainne Mullan "The Concept of Double Criminality in the Context of 
Extraterrritorial Crimes" [ 1997] Crim L R 17, 21. 
127 
Thus if, for example a request was received from the Netherlands for New Zealand to 
extradite to its courts a Cambodian national present in New Zealand who was suspected 
of widespread and systematic murder of Khmers, and the offence against Dutch Jaw was 
one of extraterritorial extermination, the territorial basis of the Dutch request would be 
irrelevant. The only matter that would need to be considered was whether the acts, if 
committed within New Zealand had the requisite criminality. It would not be necessary 
to prove that the New Zealand courts could have the jurisdictional reach to try the offence 
extraterritorially. Murder is a crime in New Zealand with a mandatory life penalty (s 167 
Crimes Act 1961 ). Other crimes against humanity could be caught by multiple charges 
under provisions such as assault (s 188-204 Crimes Act 1961 ), homicide (sections 158-
166), sexual crimes (sections 127-144), or conspiring to commit such offences (s3 10). 
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domestically. An expansive interpretation of the Extradition Act 1999 
could see Pinochet extradited for systematic murder, genocide, and 
disappearances, as well as torture committed after 1989. 
D Proposal/or Reform of New Zealand Law 
The abolition of the common law as a source of New Zealand criminal law 
means that there are significant impediments to the prosecution and 
extradition for non-statutory extraterritorial crimes committed during 
peace. 
In order for New Zealand to be in a position to meet its evolving 
international responsibilities to prosecute and extradite perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity within its territory, a legislative review 1s 
therefore urgently required. The following law changes are suggested. 
1. The replacement of the Crimes of Torture Act with a "Crimes Against 
Humanity Act", creating, with express retroactive effect, universal 
jurisdiction for all crimes against humanity. 128 
128 Crimes against humanity could be defined as an inclusive list to enable international 
advances in the definition of the offence to be reflected domestically without the need for 
subsequent law change. 
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2. An amendment to the Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 
rendering the immunities of diplomats subject to customary 
international laws on international criminal responsibility, to bring their 
immunities in line with New Zealand common law on Head of State 
immunity. 
In light of s26(1) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 precluding 
convictions for acts not illegal under New Zealand law at the time of 
commission, the passage of retroactive legislation may not be 
straightforward. The Crown Law Office would need ascertain whether the 
crime was retroactive under New Zealand laws, and if so, whether such 
retroactivity was "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society" 
in terms of s5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. 129 While a prima 
facie breach of s26(1) would probably be identified, there would be 
compelling arguments favouring a conclusion that retrospective legislation 
providing universal jurisdiction for a crime against humanity is 
demonstrably justified. 130 
129 If the law was assessed as being retroactive in terms of s26( I), and not demonstrably 
justified in terms of s5, the Attorney-General would have to report the inconsistency to 
Parliament under s7. There is some debate as to whether the Attorney-General should 
report whenever a protected right would be breached, or only if such a breach is not 
considered demonstrably justified. See Huscroft, above n 111, 138-140. 
130 See Part III(6)(b ). A retroagtiv-e-pre ~on would need to expressly override s I OA of 
the Crimes Act, in light of that precedence that section takes over contrary legislation . 
See also Gilbertson, above n 86, 567-568. 
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IV THE FUTURE 
A perusal through a human rights yearbook illustrates the global scale of 
human rights abuses. Numerous countries, every year, are documented as 
being complicit in systematic atrocities that could amount to crimes against 
humanity. These include torture, imprisonment of political opponents, 
enforced disappearance, rape, and forcible transfer of population. 131 
The effect of the Pinochet judgment should therefore not be understated. It 
is clear authority for the proposition that former Heads of State cannot 
claim immunity in municipal courts for acts of torture performed while in 
office. The judgment also suggests that immunity would be unavailable 
for other crimes against humanity. The same reasoning could potentially 
be applied to sitting Heads of State. 
Lord Millet ' s judgment in particular could have profound ramifications. 
He asserts that there has been universal jurisdiction for crimes against 
humanity since the time of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and that alljus cogens 
crimes would be punishable by municipal courts. On that basis, any 
former Heads of State who have committed crimes against humanity in the 
131 For example The Amnesty International Report 1999 (Amnesty International 
Publications, London, 1999) reports widespread torture and detention of political 
opponents in China (127), Iraq (202), Myanmar (256), India (191) widespread torture in 
Pakistan resulting in at least 50 deaths (256), systematic killings of thousands in 
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second half of this century could find themselves facing proceedings 
before domestic courts of foreign states. 
The judgment appears already to have dramatically altered the political 
landscape for human rights abusers. Former Indonesian President Suharto 
has reportedly been advised by his lawyers not to travel overseas. 132 
Likewise, the motives for the then President Habibie' s cancellation of his 
planned trip to the September APEC Heads of Government meeting in 
Auckland at the height of atrocities following the East Timorese elections 
can be speculated upon. In August, Saddam Hussein' s former deputy 
departed suddenly from Austria after a politician sought his arrest for 
torture and genocide. 133 Chile has been forced to reconsider its approach to 
immunities. In September, the Chilean Foreign Minister told a Spanish 
newspaper that "if [Pinochet] returns to Chile, he will have to respond 
before the Courts."134 
Three key messages therefore emerge from an assessment of the Pinochet 
decision. 
Afghanistan (70); widespread killings in Algeria (73); widespread torture including rape 
in custody in Bangladesh (90) and so on . 
132 "Suharto Fears the Pinochet Effect" The Independent, London, United Kingdom, 22 
August 1999 
133 "Iraqi Official Flees Austria: Alleged Role in Kurd Slayings Spurs Criminal 
Complaint" The Washington Post, United States, 19 August 1999, A 18; "How to Get 
Away With Murder, Independent, London, 22 August 1999. 
134 Nearly 50 lawsuits against Pinochet have been accepted by the Chilean courts since 
the proceedings commenced. "Rights: Extradition to Chile Shortest Route Home for 
Pinochet" JPS, Madrid, 19 October 1999. 
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The first is for law makers. It is critical to create a robust domestic legal 
regime that allows for the prosecution and extradition of international 
criminals. An urgent legislative review is required to enable New Zealand 
to fulfil its international responsibilities in this regard. 
The second is for judges and practitioners. In cases of ambiguity, or 
legislative gap, a number of international legal principles should be 
invoked to ensure international criminals do not go unpunished. 
The third and most important message is to Heads of State who brutalise 
their citizens. The international community will no longer tolerate these 
cnmes. 
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